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I am indebted.PRICE AND  MONETARY  CONVERGENCE  IN  CURRENCY  UNIONS:  THE  FRANC  AND  RAND  ZONES
Introduction.
Why  should  a country  choose  to sacrifice  monetary  independence  by joining  a
currency  union? One obvious  reason  is  to achieve  exchange  rate,  price  and
monetary  stability,  as  membership  of an  union  provides  an otherwise
hard-to-achieve  credibility  for  a policy  of  monetary  restraint. Such
stability  should  be conducive  to  overall  economic  performance 2. That
membership  can  achieve  this  objective  is suggested  by economic  theory  which
implies  that  a  currency  union  will impose  significant  macroeconomic
discipiines  on its  members. For  example,  provided  there  is sufficient
economic  integration  witht  the  rest  of the  world,  the  law  of  one  price  should
lead  to convergence  of price  levels,  at least  for  what  may  be regarded  as
tradeable  goods. Likewise  arbitrage  would  imply  convergence  of interest
rates. Finally,  expansion  of domestic  credit  in  one  small  member  should
spill  over  into  its  balance  of  payments  rather  than  generating  local
inflation.  This  paper  looks  at the  two  main  surviving  currency  unions,  the
franc  and  rand  zones  in  Africa,  to  see  whether  and  to  what  extent  these
generally  accepted  propositions  find  confirmation  in the  data.
As  with  most fixed  exchange  rate  systems 3 the  African  currency  unions  have a
dominant  or "core"  country,  France  in  the  case  of the  franc  zone  and  the
Republic  of South  Africa  (RSA)  in the  case  of the  rand  zone. Because  these
dominant  countries  are  so  much larger  than  the  rest 4, there  is  no need  to
consider  feedback  from  periphery  to  core (and  thus  the  extensive  literature
on policy  cooperation  in  the  EMS  has  no application  here). Our  focus  is  on
the  small  members  in the  'periphery"  and  for  them  there  is the  additional
presumption  that  inflation  and  interest  rates  will  be imported  from  the  core.
On first  inspection,  the  data  suggests  a  number  of deviations  from  the
theoretical  picture. For  example,  cumulative  consumer  price  inflation
1980-87  in the  franc  zone  varied  from  30  per  cent  (Burkina  Faso)  to 100  per
cent (Central  African  Republic). Widespread  concern  has also  been expressed
2 The  overall  economic  performance  of the  franc  zone  countries  compared  with
other  countries  has  been  the  subject  of recent  investigations  (Devarajan  and
de Melo,  1987a  and  b, Guillaumont  and  Guillaumont  1988,  Guillaumont,
Guillaumont  and  Plane,  1988).
3  For  the  EMS,  see  Honohan  and  McNelis  (1989),  for  Bretton  Woods  and  the  Gold
Standard,  see  Giovannini  (1988).
4  The  GDP  of France  is 21 times  the  combined  GDP  of the  13 CFA  countries;
that  of RSA  some  one  hundred  times  the  combined  GDP  of Lesotho  and  Swaziland.2
about  a loss  of  competitiveness  in  several  of the  African  franc  zone
countries. Furthermore  the  government  of Cameroon  has  borrowed  domestically
at rates  which  are  several  percentage  points  below  the  yield  on  French
Government  paper.
Nevertheless,  as  will  be shown  below,  closer  examination  suggests  that
consumer  price  inflation  is  largely  determined  by core  country  inflation  in
the  long  run.  Convergence  to core  inflation  is,  however,  slow,  and in
particular  fiscal  policy  may  have a small  transtory  influence.  The limited
evidence  available  suggests  that  uncontrolled  interest  rates  do converge  to
core  country  levels. As predicted  by theory  variations  in the  volume  of
domestic  credit  are  seen  in  most  cases  to spill  over  into  the  balance  of
payments.
A  methodological  note is  appropriate  at this  point. As we are  interested  in
time  series  properties  of price  and  monetary  variables,  we really  need  to
look  at quarterly  data  in  addition  to the  annual  series. The  quality  of
sub-annual  data in  the  countries  under  examination  is  generally  poor.
However  monetary  and  price  data  are  available.  Our research  strategy  is  to
attempt  to  meet  the  econometric  problem  of underspecificied  equations  (due  to
lack  of suitable  non-monetary  quarterly  data)  by use  of time  trend  and
intercept  shift  dummy  variables.
1  The  African  currency  unions
Most  African  countries  entered  the  post-colonial  era  with fixed  exchange
rates  vis-a-vis  the  pound  sterling  or the  franc  and  fairly  open  capital
accounts  with their  former  colonizing  powers. One  by one,  however,  the
sterling  area  countries  abandoned  this  link  and  in 1986  the  Gambia  became  the
last  African  country  to  move  from  sterlinge.
5  Members  of the  East  African  Economic  Community  had a common  currency  area
in  the  years  before  1977. The  Kenya,  Uganda  and  Tanzania  shillings  continued
to  share  a  common  parity  until  1979,  but  by 1981  they  had gone  their  separate
ways.  The  Liberian  currency  still  retains  its  de jure  link  with the  US
dollar.3
In  contrast,  most  of the  former  French  colonies  stayed 6 with the  so-called  CFA
franc  and  with  a fixed  French  franc  parity 7. The  CFA  zone  comprises  two
distinct  currency  unions,  the  UMOA (West  African)  and  the  BEAC (Central
African)  zone,  each  with its  own  central  bank (the  BCEAO  and  the  BEAC)  and
each  with  its  own  CFA  francs. Between  them  the  two  unions  have thirteen
member  countries9  with a total  population  of some  seventy  million. Along  with
the  fixed  exchange  rate,  the  members  of the  CFA  zone  have traditionally
retained  an open international  capital  market,  with statutory  freedom  of
capital  movements  among  the  member  countries  and  with France' 0.
Although  the  members  of the  CFA  zone  display  quite  a  variety  in  terms  of  size
and  prosperity,  they  are  all  dependent  on one  or two  primary  products  for  the
bulk  of their  exports  to  the industrial  world,  but  otherwise  their  economies
display  considerable  variations. In  much  of  what follows  we concentrate  on
the  two  largest  economies,  namely,  Cote  d'Ivoire  (which  accounts  for  38 per
cent  of  UMOA  GDP)  and  Cameroon  (60  per  cent  of BEAC  zone  GDP).
The  Rand zone  comprises  the  Republic  of South  Africa,  Lesotho  and  Swaziland.
Lesotho  and  Swaziland  have their  own  currencies  and  Central  Banks,  but  these
currencies  are  freely  exchangeable  for  South  African  rand  at one-for-one  and
the  rand  circulates  freely" in  these  countries.  There  is  freedom  of capital
6 Guinea  (Conakry)  abandoned  the  French  franc  on independence;  Mauritania  and
Madagascar  stayed  with  the  French  franc  until  1973,  though  neither  joined  a
union. Mali left  the  Franc  zone  after  independence,  only  to rejoin  it in
1967,  and  to  become  a  member  of the  UMOA in  1984. Togo  was  not a founder
member  of UMOA  either,  but  joined  after  a change  of  government  in 1963. In
1985  Equatorial  Guinea  became  both the  smallest  member  of the  CFA  zone  and
the  first  member  not to  have  been  a former  French  colony.
7  Althoughl  it  has shrunk  over  the  years,  the  French  franc  zone  is  somewhat
larger  than  the  CFA  zone  plus  France. Monaco  and  the  Comoros  Islands  (north
of Madagascar)  together  with  a  handful  of overseas  dependencies  of France
make  up the  rest  of the  zone.
8 The two  currencies  have  slightly  different  names  but share  the  acronym  "CPA
franc"  by which  the  colonial  currency  was also  known. Tne  currencies,  both
valued  at one-fiftieth  of the  French  franc,  have  retained  this  peg  for  forty
years.
9 They  are:  Benin,  Burkina  Faso,  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Mali,  Niger,  Senegal  and  Togo
(UMOA);  Cameroon,  Central  African  Republic,  Chad,  Congo,  Equatorial  Guinea,
and  Gabon (BEAC).
10 The  operation  of the  CFA  zone  is  examined  in  detail  in  Bhatia  (1985)  and
in Guillaumont  and  Guillaumont  (1984). There  have  been  some  recent  changes
in the  operating  rules  of the  UMOA (1989).
11  Rands  may form  as much  as  much  as one-half  or  more  of total  currency
circulation  in these  countries.4
movements  between  Lesotho,  Swaziland  and  South  Africa 12. Lesotho  and
Swaziland  are  both  landlocked,  Lesotho  being  completely  surrounded  by South
Africa. While  Swaziland  has a  reasonably  diversified  economy  by  African
standards,  Lesotho's  national  income  is  heavily  dependent  on that  earned  by
miners  working  in South  Africa.
Monitary Policy
Each  of the  CFA  Central  Banks  establishes  an annual  monetary  program  for  its
member  countries  with the  objective  of  protecting  its  external  reserves. The
program  translates  into  national  targets  for  domestic  credit,  public  and
private. These  are  implemented  through  a  variety  of instruments  including
bank-by-bank  credit  ceilings  and  refinancing  quotas  for  each  bank at the
Central  Bank. Most interest  rates  are  administratively  controlled,  including
bank lending  rates  for  different  categories  of  credit. However  banks  are
free  to  negotiate  interest  rates  for  wholesale  deposits. Commercial  bank
recourse  to  Central  Bank  refinancing  is  very  heavy  in  most  countries,
accounting  on average  for  a third  of commercial  bank lending. Some  of this
refinancing  is  provided  at concessional  rates  with  ceilings  on the  onlending
rates. The  matrix  of interest  rates  is  set  at  a common  level  throughout  the
UMOA,  whereas  in the  BEAC  zone  only  the  Central  Bank's  intervention  rates  are
common  across  the  zone. Of course,  France  has its  own  Central  Bank,  but  it
is also  represented  in  each  of the  CFA  Central  Banks.
Lesotho  and  Swaziland  determine  their  monetary  policy  independently  of each
other  and  of South  Africa. South  Africa  has  no representation  in either  of
the  Central  Banks  of Lesotho  or Swaziland. Accordingly  there  is  no formal
arrangement  for  common  interest  rates  in the  rand  zone 13.
2 Convergence  of inflation
The  annual  trends  in  consumer  price  indices  in  CFA  countries  over  a quarter
century  are  shown  in  Figure  la.  These  show  that,  despite  the  wide
divergences  which  has  occurred  between  cumulative  inflation  rates  over  as
12  Apart  from  the  US dollar,  the  only  other  currencies  to  which  other
currencies  are  now  pegged  are  the  Australian  dollar  (Kiribati  and  Tonga),  and
the  Indian  rupee  (Bhutan). In  each  of these  cases  the  pegging  country  is
very  small  and  dependent  on  the  peg  country.
13  In  effect,  the  formal  arrangements  under  the  Common  Monetary  Area
agreement  between  the  rand  zone  members  relate  to  reserve  holdings,  to  common
application  of  exchange  controls,  and  to  the  payment  of  seignorage  by South
Africa  to  Lesotho  and  Swaziland  in respect  of the  estimated  quantity  of rand
circulating  in  those  countries.4-a
FIGURE  lA
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long  as six  or seven  years  (as  mentioned  above),  in  the  longer  run  the  price
indices  appear  to  have  a common  trend. A com^on  trend  is even  more
pronounced  in  the  data  for  the  rand  zone  (Figure  lb)
2.1  Principal  Component  Analysis  of the  CFA  zone
In  order  to examine  the  degree  of  price  level  convergence  in the  CFA  zone
more  closely,  the  annual  data  for  the  (log-)CPI  of France  and  of the  nine
CFA  countries  for  which  this  was  available,  was examined  for  the  period
1964-8713.  The  hypothesis  to  be considered  is that  most  of the  variation
in  these  countries'  price  levels  can  be summarised  by a single  common
factor. To this  end the  principal  components  of the  price  data  were
computed" 4 . The  striking result is that the first principal compon.ent
explains  99.3%  of the  total  variation  in  this  data  set.  The  bulk  of
inflation  in the  CFA  countries  and  France  is  essentially  a single  common
variable. The  second  principal  component  accounts  for  a further  0.3%,
while  the  third  can  only  manage  just  over  0.1%. At most,  the  first  two
components  can  be of interest 15.
Figure  2 plots  actual  CPI  for  most  of the  countries  together  with  the  first
two  principal  components.  Each  panel  shows  a  country's  CPI  against  the
same  background  of thp  two  principal  components.  As can  be seen,  the  first
principal  component  tracks  actual  CPI  rather  closely:  in fact  the
correlation  between  rhe  first  component  and  the  CPI  is  better  than  0.992
for  each  country. The  loading  of  each  country  on the  first  component  does
13  Note:  figures  for  Senegal  1964-66  were  extrapolated  backwards. All  of the
data  used  in the  paper  is from  Internatlonal  Financial  Statistics  with the
exception  of the  average  lending  rates  in  Lesotho  (Section  4  below)  which
were  kindly  provided  by the  Central  Bank  of Lesotho.
14 Principal  components  analysis  is  a technique  used  when it  is thought
possible  to summarize  most of the  variation  in  a large  number  of  variables  -
in this  case  the  CPIs  for  the  ten  countries  - by just  a few  artificially
constructed  variables. Loosely  speaking,  the  first  principal  component  is  an
artificial  variable  constructed  so that  it  has  the  highest  possible
correlation  with the  collection  of  variables  being  examined;  the  second
principal  component  has  the  highest  correlation  wIth the  residuals  left  after
subtracting  out  what is  explained  by the  first  principal  component. The
"loading'  of  a particular  country  on the  first  principal  component  is the
regression  coefficient  obtained  by regressing  the  country's  CPI  on that
component.
15  A number  of standard  tests  reject  the  hypothesis  that  all  roots  but the
first  are  zero,  hence,  despite  its  small  explnatory  power,  it  seems
reasonable  to  examine  briefly  the  loadings  on the  second  component. The
first  principal  component  of the  differenced  price  series  explains  88.2  per
cent  of total  variation  in  that  series,  with a further  4.9  per  cent  and  4.0
per  cent  being  explained  by the  second  and  third  components.FIGIURE  1B
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FIrLURE  2 CPI:  Actual  and  Princinal  Comoonents  1964-876
not  differ  very  much,  though  some  of the  differences  are  significant,  with
the  outliers  being  Burkina  Faso (16%  lower),  Cote  d'Ivoire  (11%  higher)  and
G&bon  (12%  higher),  implying  that  these  countries  may  respond
systematically  to  rising  zone-wide  price  level  with  a lower  (Burkina  Faso)
or higher  (Cote  d'Ivoire,  Gabon)  amplitude. These  differences  can  also  be
detecte.  visually  in the  figure:  note,  for  example,  that  the  increase  in
Burk.-.a  Faso's  CPI  is smaller  than  that  in the  first  component. It  is also
evident  from  viaual  inspection  that  this  first  principal  component  tracks
the  French  inflation  closer  than  that  of the  other  countries  (except
Gabon). This is  confirmed  statistically  (the  correlation  for  France  is
bettet  than  0.998). Therefore  it is  safe  to  assert  that  the  first
principal  component  reflects  French  inflation  and  that  this  is  the
determining  factor  for  the  great  bulk  of inflation  in the  CFA  zone 16.
16  With  nominal  exchange  rate  stability  vis-a-vis  the  French  franc,  and  a
common  trend  in  domestic  inflation  it  is  natural  to  assume  that  the  CFA
countries  should  have  achieved  stability  of the  real  exchange  rate,  at least
in terms  of relative  consumer  prices  at  home  and  abroad. Despite  much
discussion  of this  issue,  it  appears  to  be unresolved  in the  literature.  In
a  recent  paper,  de  Macedo  (1984)  asserted  that  the  franc  zone  countries  had
"achieved  nominal  stability  at the  expense  of real  stability",  an assertion
that  was  echoed  by Devarajan  and  de  Melo (1987a),  but  contradicted  by
Guillaumont,  Guillaumont  and  Plans  (1988)  quotin.g  Paraire  (1988). It is
certainly  true,  and  was shown  by de  Macedo,  that  nominal  exchange  rate
stability  has  not  entailed  real  stability,  but that  does  not imply  th.  t
alternative  regimes  have  provided  stability. Paraire  used  a sampLe  of annual
exchange  rate  and  CPI  data  for  76  developing  countries  to show  that  CFA
countries  had,  on average,  lower  variances  of their  nominal  and  real
effective  exchange  rate  indices  than  other  developing  countries  in the  period
1970-83. His  methodology  was,  however,  marred  by  his  neglect  of the
distortions  created  by the  enormous  variances  generated  in  high inflation
countries.
A more robust  approach  is to  look  at  country  rankings. Furthermore,  in  order
to take  account  of equilibrium  trends  in  the  real  exchange  rate  it is  worth
examining  variances  about  a trend  line  or autoregression.  My 1982  study  of a
105  country  sample  provides  the  necessary  data  are  provided  in  Honohan
(1983). It strongly  suggests  that,  on these  measures,  the  CFA  countries  have
had  real  exchange  rates  neither  more  nor  less  variable  than  the  average. The
mean  rank  of the  CFA  countries  in the  sample  varied  between  42 and  67 (out  of
105)  depending  on the  measure  used.  The  hypothesis  that  the  individua'.
rankings  of CFA  countries  were randomly  distributed  among  the  105  countries
in the  sample  cannot  be rejected  (chi-squared  test)  even  at the  10  per  cent
level.
The implication  is  that  adherence  to the  French  franc  has  not given  the
members  any  greater  variability  of the  real  exchange  rate  than  has  been
experienced  by other  countries. All  of this,  however,  relates  to  consumer
prices;  comparable  data  on relative  factor  costs  might  tell  a  very  different
story,  but they  are  not  readily  available.7
The second  principal  component  predicts  a  blip in inflation  in 1975,  lower
than  average  inflation  in 1976  and  1977,  and  higher  than  average  inflation
from  1982  to  1987.  In a regression  of each  country's  CPI  on the  first  two
components,  the  second  is insignificant  in  the  case  of three  countries,
France,  Burkina  Faso  and  Gabon. In three  other  cases,  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Niger
and  Togo  the  weighting  is  negative,  while  in  the  remainder,  the  weighting
is  positive 17. Were  it  not  for  the  positive  loading  in  the  case  of
Senegal,  this  second  component  could  be seen  as a BEAC/UMOA  distinguishing
factor. However,  its  small  contribution  to  overall  variance  suggests  that
it  may  not  be an independent  common  factor. Accordingly  we proceed  to look
at the  individual  country  residuals  after  subtracting  only  the  first
principal  component.
ExDlaininz residual inflation differences,
Subtracting  the (re-scaled)  first  principal  component  from  the  individual
country  CPIs  leaves  us with  a residual  inflation  factor  which  displays
quite  a variety  of  patterns  between  the  different  countries.
Burkina  Faso  and  Congo  have a  positive  residual  in  the  1970s,  negative
in the  1980s;  the  experience  of  Gabon  is  almost  the  reverse.
Ciameroon  and  the  Central  African  Republic  have  positive  residuals
chiefly  after  abLut  1983,  whereas  Cote  d'Ivoire  and  Niger  have
positive  residuals  chiefly  before  1983.
In  addition  to  unobservable  country-specific  disturbances  which  may  have
contributed,  these  residuals  might  be explained  on the  basis  of the
different  individual  country  experiences  with regard  to  expenditure  or
monetary  variables. To explore  this  possibility,  data  on  monetary
aggregates,  oxports  and  government  and  private  consumption  were assembled
for  the  five  UNOA countries  for  which  CPI  data  was  available. These
variables  were expressed  for  each  year  1970-86  as a deviation  from  the  mean
share  in the  union.  (Thus  in the  case  of exports  for  Niger  in  1975,  for
example,  the  variable  used  was the  difference  between  Niger's  percentage
share  in  total  UMOA exports  in 1975  and  Niger's  mean  share  1970-86.)
Regression  analysis  of the  pooled  country  data  was  then  used  to  identify
possible  correlations  between  these  measures  of monetary  and  spending
conditions  on the  one  hand  and  residual  inflation  differences  on the  other
hand.
17  This  can  also  be seen  in Figure  2  where,  for  example,  the  actual  CPI
(marked  by squares)  lies  above  the  first  principal  component  during  1976-83,
a time  when the  second  principal  component  takes  on  negative  values.8
The results  of this  analysis  suggest  that  government  spending,  especially
when financed  by credit,  contributes  to the  transitory  CPI  divergences
which  have  been  noted. Neither  the  money  stock,  not  private  credit  has  any
independent  explanatory  power,  nor does  the  value  of exportsl 8. A sample
of the  regression  results  is  contained  in  Table  1.
2.2  Dynamic  impact  of core  prices  on periphery  inflation.
Turning  to  quarterly  data  in  order  to explore  the  short-term  dynamics  of
inflation  transmission,  regression  equations  were  estimated  for  inflation
in the  largest  countries  in the  CFA  zone,  i.e.  Cote  d'Ivoire  and  Cameroon,
and  in Lesotho  and  Swaziland.  An appropriate  type  of model  to capture  this
kind  of transmission  is the  error-correction  model,  according  to  which
there  is  both  a short-term  and  a long-term  transmission  between  core  and
periphery  inflation.  A surge  in  core  inflation  leads  to  an early  response
in  periphery  inflation;  to the  extent  that  the  change  in  the  price  level  at
the  core  does  not immediately  pass through  to  the  periphery,  there  is  a
gradual  catching-up  process  to the  equilibrium  core-periphery  price
relationship.  We hypothesize  that  this  long  term  relationship  is  one  of
proportionality,  subject  to  a  possible  linear  drift. Thus,  long-term  price
trends  in,  for  example,  Cote  d'Ivoire,  may  be represented  by:
log  P*,,  -=a + log  P1 ,.+fT.
Here  T  represents  a linear  time  trend. The  short-term  dynamics  of the
price  level  are  composed  of a  partial  adjustment  to changes  in  core
inflation  plus  convergence  to  the  long-term  price  trend:
A log  P,,  - yA log Pi,.  - t(log  P.,  log PSCb)-I.
For  this  representation  to  be  valid  with  no time  trend  (i.e.  the  null
hypothesis  P-0),  the  core  and  periphery  price  levels  should  be
cointegrated.  Figure  3  plots  the  gaps  between  core  and  periphery  price
levels:  the  figure  is in  logs  and  shows  that  deviations  of  plus or  minus
about  10 per  cent  have  been  observed. There  is no clear  trend  apparent  in
the  gaps,  suggesting  again  that  the  series  may  have a  common  trend.
Nevertheless,  using  standard  tests,  the  quarterly  data  series  cannot  reject
18 Export  performance  does  influence  private,  and  possibly  government,
consumption  spending. Fooled  cross-country  regressions  (also  based  on
deviations  from  mean  share)  of government  consumption  found  domestic  credit
to government  significant  (t-2.2),  with  exports  less  so (t-1.8). The  RSQ in
that  regression,  which  included  a lagged  dependent  variable  was  0.63.  For
private  consumption,  also  with  a lagged  dependent  variable,  government
consumtpion  had  a t-statistic  of 3.0  and  exports  2.7,  with an  RSQ  of 0.85.Table  1: UMEA.  COUNTRY-SPECIFIC  PART  OF INFLATION.
Equation  No  1  2  3  4  5  6
Explanatory:  Coeff  t  Coeff  t  t  t  t  t
Government  Consumption  1.072 (4.8)  0.893 (3.8)  (3.1)  (3.0)  (2.8)  (3.0) Lagged  Dependent  Variable  0.693  (10.7)  0.719  (11.2)  (9.9)  (10.0)  (9.9)  (10.1) Domestic  Credit  to  Covern  ent  0.053 (2.1)
Domestic  CredLt  (1.4)
Mney  (M2)  (1.1)
Value  of  Exports  (1.8) Private  Consumption  (0.1)  (0.0)  (0.2)  (0.7) DUN B376*  -0.18  (4.6)  -0.19  (4.9)  (4.2)  (4.4)  (4.2)  (4.3)
DUM  SE74*  0.14  (3.5)  0.14  (3.6)
RSQ  0.721  0.736  0.676  0.684  0. 681  0. 689 DU  1.656  1.772  1.69  1.73  1.7  1.73 SER  0.0394  0.0386
This  table  shows  orm  regressions  of  a  pooled  cross-section  end  time  seres  of  country-specLfil(  lents  9 of lnflatLon.
The  regressLons  are  designed  to  measure  the  lcpact  of  demand  and  policy  factors  on  local  inflation.
Dependent  variable  is  remainder  after  subtractlng  first  prineLpal  component  from  (log(CPI)).
EXplanatory  varLables  are  country  shares  in  U)EDA  totals  expressed  as  deviations  from  semple  period  averages.
Cross-Sectlon  and  Time  SerLes,  Sa-ple  Perlod:  1970-86.
For  equations  3-6  the  t-statisties  only  (and  not  the  estimated  coefficients)  are  shown.
*Note:  Som  equations  also  Licluded  intercept  dumies  for  two  outliers,  Burkina  Faso  1976  end  SenJgal  1974.8-b
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lack  of cointegration  for  each  of the  countries  except  Cameroon 19.
However,  these  tests  used  have  relatively  low  power,  and  therefore  the  test
results  should  not  preclude  use  of an  error-correction  framework.
The  regression  results 20 for  the  dynamic  model  are  presented  in  Table  2.  A
substantial  immediate  pass-through  is found  for  all  countries  except
Camoroon,  with the  coefficient  yvranging  from  0.66 (Swaziland)  to 1.14
(Cote  d'Ivoire)  - the  latter  figure  not  significantly  larger  than  one. The
catch-up  coefficient  t  is  significantly  positive  in all  cases,  though  quite
small  ranging  from  a low  of 0.075  per  quarter  (Cote  d'Ivoire)  to a  high  of
0.175  (Cameroon).  This implied  slow  adjustment  (half  of the  adjustment
takes  between  about  four  and  nine  quarters)  is consistent  with  the  failure
to reject  lack  of cointegration:  if  adjustment  is that  slow,  longer  time
series  would  be necessary  to  provide  conclusive  evidence  of cointegration.
The  time  trends  are  not significant  for  any  of the  four  countries  in the
common  sample  period  1973-88  and  the  equations  were  reestimated  without
trends  as shown 2l.  (Addition  of the  rate  of  expansion  of the  real  credit
supply  as an indication  of monetary  conditions  did  not  add  significantly  to
the  equations  either).
The simple  equations  which  have  been  estimated  confirm  the  general  picture
of long-term  inflation  trends  being  determined  mainly  by core  inflation,
i.e.  French  and  South  African  inflation  respectively  for  the  two  zones.
19 Three  of the  tests  recommended  by Engle  and  Granger,  1987,  were employed,
namely  the  CRDW,  the  Dickie-Fuller  and  the  augmented  Dickie-Fuller  with four
lags.  Except  for  the  last  test,  which  was significant  for  Cameroon  at the
five  per cent  level,  none  was significant  even  at the  ten  per  cent  level.
20 We also  allowed  some  dummy  variables  to  have  a transitory  impact  on
inflation.  As in the  later  sections  of the  paper,  each  equation  was
estimated  with  and  without  time  trends  (the  reported  equations  include  these
trends  only  where  significant),  and  dummies  for  any  observation  more  than
three  standard  deviations  outside  the  estimated  regression  line. Correction
for  up to  second-order  autocorrelation  was  also  made  where  necessary. In
addition  to the  basic  specificAtion,  less  parsimonious  representations  with
longer  lags  were tried,  but the  restrictions  implied  by the  reported
equations  held.
21 For  the  franc  zone  countries  data  is  available  back to  1968;  using  this
longer  series  the  situation  regarding  time  trends  is less  clear. Cameroon
displays  a significant  time  trend,  but in  the  equation  for  Cote  d'Ivoire  the
time  trend  remains  below  conventional  significance  levels. Both  estimated
time  trends  imply  values  of long-term  drift  in  periphery  inflation  of about
one  per  cent  per  annum  (estimated  e  is 1.0  per  cent  per  annum  for  Cote
d'Ivoire  and 1.2  per  cent  per  annum  for  Cameroon). Such  slow  drifts  do  not
necessarily  imply  that  prices  for  individual  commodities  drifted  apart  as
between  core  country  and  periphery;  they  would,  for  example  be compatible
with shifting  relative  composition  of the  consumption  baskets.9-a
Table  2: Dynamics  of Inflation  Transmission
Csmeroon:
dP  - 0.029  +  0.23  dPe.*  - 0.175  GAP- 1 +  0.075  D853
(4.0)  (0.7)  (3.2)  (3.6)
RSQ-0.307  SEE-0.0203  DW-1.98  73.2-88.4
Cote  d'Ivoire:
dP  - 0.002  + 1.14  dP 0 o  - 0.075  GAP- 1 +  0.147  D772
(0.2)  (3.6)  (2.4)  (6.1)
RSQ-0.517  SEE-0.0237  DW-2.00  73.2-88.4
Lesotho:
dP  -0.007 +  0.69  dPear  - 0.087  GAP- 1 +  0.056  D831  +  0.047  D792
(1.0)  (3.3)  (2.1)  (3.8)  (3.2)
RSQ-0.383  SEE-0.0146  DW-2.18  73.2-88.4
Swaziland:
dP  - 0.001  + 0.66  dP,or.  - 0.112  GAP- 1 +  0.074  D793  +  0.060  D844
(0.1) (2.1)  (2.3)  (3.5)  (3.1)
RSQ-0.404  SEE-0.0191  DW-1.84  73.2-88.4
Notes: P is log  of CPI  in  periphery  country. P.r.  is  log  of  CPI  in  core
country  (France  for  the  franc  zone,  South  Africa  for  the  rand  zone),  GAP  is
the  log  ratio  of the  two  price  indices.  prefix  Id"  denotes  first  diffirence.
D's  are  one-shot  intercept  dummies  for  the  dates  indicated. T-statist!cs  are
in  parentheses.10
However,  the  regressions  "explain"  between  30 and  58  per  cent  of quarterly
variations  in inflation  leaving  considerable  deviations  to  be explained  by
other  factors.
3 Credit  expansion  and  monetary  equilibrium
If credit  expansion,  one  of the  chief  tools  of  monetary  policy,  does  not  have
an important  effect  on inflation  it  is important  to  assess  what  its  effects
are. The  openness  of the  economies  suggest  that  the  effects  of  credit  policy
on output  and  employment  are  also  likely  to  be weak. Accordingly,  one  may
suppose  that  if there  is too  much  credit  expansion,  it  will simply  leak  out
into  imports  or capital  movements;  if there  is too  little,  there  will  be made
up  by capital  inflows. A visual  examination  (Figure  4) of the  trends  in  real
money  and  credit  suggests  that  credit  expansion  has  had  little  impact  on the
determinants  of money  demand  (with  the  possible  exception  of Cameroon  before
1986). This  view  appears  confirmed  by the  results  of statistical  analysis  of
the  short-  and  long-term  relation  between  domestic  credit  expansion  and
monetary  growth  in three  of four  countries  examined.
redit and  Monev:  A  Model
A simplified  monetary  balance  sheet  indicates  that  the  counterparts  of the
money  stock  are  chiefly  domestic  credit  of the  banking  system  and  the
external  reserves.  We may  regard  domestic  credit  as subject  to  policy
control  while  the  other  counterparts  adjust  endogenously.  If  an expansion  in
domestic  credit  leads  to increased  output  or interest  rates  on  a sustained
basis,  then  demand  for  money  can  be expected  to respond. However,  if
domestic  credit  expansion  has  no long-term  effect  on output  (or  interest
rates),  it  will  be offset  by a reduction  in  the  other  counterparts,
essentially  through  a fall  in  external  reserves.
In order  to explore  this  issue  in the  absence  of an adequate  database  for  a
proper  quarterly  demand  for  money  estimate,  we inquire  as  to  whether  credit
is  an empirical  proxy  for  unmeasured  determinants  of the  long-term  demand  for
money. Thus  we write  the  demand  for  money  as:
M'-p.yC+6X,
where  C is  domestic  credit  and  X is  other  measured  variables  affecting  the
demand  for  money. The  hypothesis  to  be tested  is  that  the  coefficient  V  is
zero.  We assume  convergence  of actual  to desired  money  stock  according  to:
AM  = aAC  + t(M!4  - M_J.lO-a
Figure  4
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This  process  combines  an immediate  impact  of  credit  on  money  offset  later  by
a convergence  of  money (at  the  rate  t)  to its  desired  level,  possibly
depending  on credit  depending  on  whether  v  is  zero 22. This  provides  the
estimating  equation:
AM-UAC+1  3* y*C.4 +6*X- 4+tM  ,,
where,
Ys - t.
Evidence: Some  estimates  of this  equation  are  reported  in  Table  3  with time
trends  and  dummies  substituted  for  the  "other  factors"  X.  These  provide  a
test  of whether  the  effect  of expansions  in  domestic  credit  (C)  have  a
22 Lag lengths  other  than  four  give  generally  similar  results.12
long-term  Y  effect  as  well as a  short-term  a  effect  on the  money  supply 25.
This is  a standard  error-correction  framework  which  allows  the  expansion  in
domestic  credit  to  have an  effect  which  is  spread  out  over  time. If  a  equals
unity,  then  the  short  run  effect  of credit  expansion  on  money  is  one-for-one.
Otherwise,  domestic  credit  expansion  partly  leaks  out  into  the  balance  of
payments  even  in the  first  quarter. The  coefficient  t  measures  the  speed  of
convergence  to the  steady  state  value  of  money. If the  coefficient  Y  is  not
23 Note  that  this  equation  does  not  report  any  interest  sensitivity  in the
demand  for  money. Most commentators  have supposed  that  the  openness  of the
capital  market  might  mean  that  such  interest  differentials  as emerge  between
the  CFA  countries  and  France  - and  they  have  approached  two  percentage  points
at times  even  since  1981  - would  be enough  to induce  important  capital  flows.
This should  show  up as a degree  of interest  sensitivity  in the  demand  for
money. An earlier  analysis  of the  demand  for  money  in  Cote  d'Ivoire  did
identify  an interest  rate  effect  in the  Ivorian  demand  for  money,  but  the
coefficient  was  barely  significant  and  not  robust  to  changes  in  equation
specificatica.
That  study  (Honohan  1988)  reported  the  following  equation  for  monthly  data
(seasonally  adjusted)  in  M2, 1979.01  to 1987.06:
DeLM - 0.0401 - 0.103 DelNL,  + 0.567 Rdiff  - 1.954  Time + Dummies
(3.16) (3.92)  (1.93)  (1.67)
RSQ - 0.941  SEE - 0.0262  DW - 1.81
Where  DelM is the  logarithmic  monthly  change  in  M2;  and  RdLff  is  the
differential  between  money  market  rates  in  Cote  d'Ivoire  and  France. The
dummies  intercept  shifts  to  cope  with shifting  seasonality  at the  beginning
and  end  of the  harvest  season:  they  exclude  all  outliers  beyond  four  standard
deviations.
The interesting  feature  of this  equation  is  the  possible  sensitivity  of the
money  stock  to  the  international  interest  rate  differential.  However  the
effect  is  very impreeisely  measured  and is  not  quite  significant  at the  five
per cent  level. One  could  not  assert  with  confidenee  that  the  effect  was  not
a statistical  artifact.
Furthermore  it  is  not  robust  to fairly  small  changei  in  the  specification  or
in the  sample  period. By extending  the  sample  it  be omes  evident  that  in the
mid 1970s  there  was  a  positive  association  between  tei  interest  differential
in favour  of  Abidjan  and  the  quantity  of  money. While  this  can  be  blamed  on
simultaneity,  and  interpreted  as  a policy  response  and  thus  a supply  effect.
Leite  and  Makonnen  (1986)  were equally  unable  to  find  a robust  impact  of
interest  on saving  in  the  BCEAO  countries.
One  plausible  hypothesis  explaining  the  difficulty  in identifying  a strong
effect  is  that  mobile  liquid  assets  of Ivorians  are  already  held  outside  of
Africa. On this  interpretation,  applicable  possibly  also  to the  other  CFA
countries,  the  money  supply  in  the  CFA  zone  is  held  primarily  for
transactions  purposes;  the  role  of interest  rate  policy  in this  low-inflation
environment  may then  be more  to allow  for  rational  allocation  of credit  than
to ensure  that  mobile  funds  remain  in  Africa.13
significantly  different  from  zero,  no long  term  relation  between  credit  and
money  can  be reliably  postulated.  All  variables  are  measured  in  seasonally
adjusted  real  terms2 4.
(a)  MhM  aieslts.  For  three  of  the  four  countries  the  expectation  that
domestic  credit  will  have  a transitory  effect  only  is confirmed. Table  3
shows  illustrative  regression  equations. In the  franc  zone  the  results  for
Cote  d'Ivoire  give  the  best  results  in this  respect. Rather  more  than
one-half  of domestic  credit  "leaks  out"  in  the  same  quarter  with  no
significant  long-term  effect 25. The  two  rand  zone  countries  display  no
strong  link  between  credit  and  money  either  in the  short  run (CZ  is small  or
insignificant)  or in the  long  run (e is insignificant).
Cameroon  once  again  provides  the  exception. Despite  zxperiments  with  time
trends,  which  proved  insignificant,  the  lagged  credit  '.a."  persists  as
significant.  About  one-third  of credit  expansion  seea.E  to  augment  the  money
stock  permanently  (indeed  the  point  estimate  of  - is L.57). We can  only
retain  the  hypothesis  on the  assumption  that  credit  here  provides  a  better
proxy  for  the  omitted  variables  determining  money  demand. It  may  also  be
that  credit  expansion  in  Cameroon  was  more  conservative  and  in line  with
general  economic  expansion.
4 Interest  rates
In all  of the  countries  that  we are  looking  at some  interest  rates  are
controlled  administratively.  In a  closed  economy,  the  existence  of
administrative  controls  could  spill  over  and  affect  uncontrolled  interest
rates. Thus,  for  example,  compulsory  non-remunerated  reserve  requirements
would  be expected  to affect  deposit  and  lending  rates  of the  commercial
banks. The  openness  implied  by the  fixed  exchange  rate  and freedom  of
capital  movements  in the  currency  unions  suggests  that  uncontrolled  rates,  at
least  for  large  deposits  and  for  loans  to first-class  risks  may  be determined
by international  arbitrage  rather  than  by domestic  considerations.  This
prompts  us to examine  available  data  to see  to  what  extent  domestic  interest
rate  controls  influence  the  uncontrolled  rates.
24 The  franc  zone  data  is deflated  by the  French  consumer  price  index.
25  Actually,  a clear  short-run  impact  of  credit  on  money  was obtained  for  all
of the  UMOA countries.  And,  with  the  possible  exception  of Burkina  Faso,  the
coefficient  v was insignificant,  implying  no long-term  effect.13-a
Table  3:  Domestic  Credit  and  Money:  Short  and  Long-Term  Impacts
Cameroon:
dM  - -0.81  +  0.469  dC  0.149  M-A  +  0.234  C.4  - 0.0031  T - 0.112  D874
(1.9)  (7.8)  (2.8)  (3.8)  (2.9)  (3.1)
RSQ-0.65  SEE-0.035  DW-1.94  74.2-89.2
Cote  d'Ivoire:
dM - 0.64  +  0.377  dC - 0.086  MK,  +  0.015  C-4  - 0.128  D794  rhol-0.25
(2.8)  (3.9)  (2.2)  (0.6)  (3.5)  (1.8)
RSQ-0.54  SEE-0.036  DW-2.01  73.4-88.2
Lesotho:
dM  - 0.55  +  0.151  dC  0.130  M  ,  +  0.036  C-,  rhol--0.25 rho2--0.48
(3.5)  (2.3)  (3.2)  (1.5)  (1.5)  (3.0)
RSQ-0.43  SEE-0.026  DW-2.22  81.3-89.3
Swaziland:
dM  - 0.55 +  0.023 dC - 0.109 M.s  +  0.012 C_,  rhol--0.24
(2.7)  (0.5)  (2.7)  (0.9)  (1.7)
RSQ-0.14  SEE-0.066  DW-2.13  75.3-89.3
Notes: M is log  of  wide  money  supply  M2,  C is  domestic  credit;  prefix  Id'd
denotes  first  difference.  Rho's  are  likelihood  maximizing  autocorrelation
coefficients.  D's  are  one-shot  intercept  dummies  for  the  dates  indicated.
All  variables  seasonally  adjusted. C-statistics  in  parentheses.14
4.1  The  CFA  zone
Relevant  data  is  not really  available  for  the  franc  zone. The  extensive
control  of interest  rates  exercised  by the  authorities  in the  two  CFA  zone
has resulted  in  fairly  wide  differentials  of these  controlled  rates
vis-a-vis  Paris. This  is  especially  true  in respect  of  bank lending  rates
for  lending  which  has  been  refinanced  by the  Central  Bank  at  a subsidised
rate. Naturally,  such  refinancing  is  rationed  and  so the  relevant  rates  of
interest  are  not  market-clearing.  Revisions  in the  administered  rates  have
been rather  infrequent.  For  example  the  normal  rediscount  rate  of the  BEAC
stood  at 9  per  cent  from  late  1982  until  early  1986,  a period  during  which
Paris  interbank  rates  fell  from  over  1.3  per  cent  to less  than  9  per cent.
The  most  frequently  revised  rates  have  been the  BCEAO's  so called  Taux  du
Marche  Monetaire  (TMM)  which  apply  to  bankers'  deposits  with  the  Central
Bank  and to  some  non-preferential  redicounts.  Figure  5  plots  the  overnight
lending  TMM  against  Paris  money  market  rates  and  displays  the  fairly  close
correlation  between  the  two  in  recent  years. However,  because  many  UMOA
banks  are  persistently  in  debt  to  the  BCEAO,  and  because  borrowing  at the
TMM is  subject  to  ceilings  and  to  the  discretion  of the  BCEAO,  the  TMM  can
only  be considered  as an imperfect  indicator  of the  marginal  cost  of funds
to  UYIOA  banks.  In  particular  it is  not  clear  how  closely  interbank  rates
or the  wholesale  deposit  rates  offered  by banks  follow  the  TMM (no  time
series  on these  rates  is  collected  by the  BCEAO). Because  cL  the  weak
condition  of  many  UMOA (and  BEAC)  banks,  c(afidence  is  low  among  wholesale
depositors  and  the interbank  markets  are  very thin. As explained  above
there  is  no strong  evidence  of a  high  degree  of interest  rate  sensitivity
of  money  demand  in  UMOA countries,  a fact  which  suggests  that  only  minimum
working  balances  are  held in  banks  in the  UMOA,  with  most  portfolio
investment  already  placed  in France,  Monaco  or elsewhere. It is  possible
therefore  that  uncontrolled  interest  rates  also  deviate  from  French
comparators;  but in the  absence  of reliable  series  on non-administered
interest  rates  in the  CFA  zone,  we are  unable  to draw  definite  conclusions.
4.2  The  rand  zone:  effectiveness  of interest  rate  policy  in  Lesotho 26
We now  examine  evidence  from  Lesotho,  where  data  is  more  readily  available
on uncontrolled  interest  rates. The  Central  Bank  of Lesotho  sets  only  the
prime  lending  rate,  the  minimum  savings  deposit  rate,  as  well  as the
Treasury  bill  rate  and  the  rates  on  banks'  deposits  with the  CBL.  These
26 This  section  draws  on earlier  work  done  jointly  with Ignacio  Mas.14-a
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rates  are  revised  several  times  per  year  and  changes  usually,  but  not
always,  follow  the  corresponding  South  African  rates  fairly  closely.
However,  the  prime  rate  has  generally  been  held  below  the  South  African
prime  rate.  The  deposit  rates  offered  by the  CBL  are  also  somewhat  below
RSA  rates. Since  it  began  to  be regulated  in 1986,  the  minimum  rate  on
savings  deposits,  whil,  it is  set  at about  the  same  level  as the  rate  on
large  savings  deposits  in  RSA, it  is  much  higher  than  that  offered  by RSA
banks  and  building  societies  for  small  savings  deposits. There  are  neither
floors  nor ceilings  on the  bank  lending  rates  (despite  the  administered
'prime  lending  rate",  which  mainly  serves  as  an indicative  rate)  or on the
bank  deposit  rates  other  than  the  savings  rate, The  question  to  be
addressed  here is  whether  the  RSA  rates  or the  Central  Bank  administered
rates  are  more relevant  in  determining  the  non-administered  rates  in
Lesotho.
Lending  Tnterest  Rates
The  average  lending  rate  in  Lesotho  has  at all  times  exceeded  the  prime
rate,  usually  by two  to three  percentage  points,  but  exceptionally  by as
much  as 7  points  during  1984 (Figure  6).  On the  other  hand,  the  average
lending  rate  in Lesotho  fell  short  of the  South  African  prime  rate
throughout  1984.
The  prime  rate  in  Lesotho  is  set  administratively:  to  what extent  does  it
determine  the  average  lending  rate?  Even  if  the  prime  rate  is out  of line
with  market  conditions,  it  may  persist  because  banks  can  adjust  the  average
lending  rate  above  prime. One  hypothesis  is,  then,  that  the  banks  counter
any  discrepancies  between  the  prime  rates  in  Lesotho  and  South  Africa  by
adjusting  their  average  lending  rates  relative  to the  prime  rate  in
Lesotho. The following  equation,  estimated  on quarterly  data  from  1984  to
1988  suggests  that  such  an  hypothesis  is at  least  partially  true.
dAVG 1..  - 1.222 +  0.990 dPRM,.  - 0.552 GAP(-l) +  0.397 (PRML.a-PRM1,,)
(3.4)  (6.7)  (4.0)  (3.1)
RSQ - 0.749  SEE - 0.848  DW - 2.19
where  AVG is  the  average  lending  rates  PRM  is the  prime  rate,  GAP(-l)  is
the  lagged  difference  between  AVG and  PRM..,  and  "d"  denotes  quarterly
change.15-a
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This  equation  suggests  that  the  average  lending  in  Lesotho  is  dominated  by
the  South  African  prime  rate. When the  prime  rates  in Lesotho  and  the  RSA
are  increased,  the  average  lending  rate  increases  entirely  in step.  If,  on
the  other  hand,  the  prime  rate  in  Lesotho  does  not increase  while  the  prime
rate  in the  RSA  does,  the  average  rate  originally  lags  behind  in the
increase,  but  catches  up eventually.  In this  case,  one  half of the  gap
between  the  two  rates  is  closed  in  each  quarter.
The  conclusion  is that  the  authorities'  ability  to influence  average
lending  rates  is  at most  transitory.  Within  a few  quarters  the  banks  have
adjusted  their  lending  rates  to their  traditional  relationship  with those
in  RSA.
Degosit  Interest_Rate
Commercial  banks  in  Lesotho  offer  a  variety  of deposit  accounts:  savings
accounts,  24  hour  call  accounts,  and  term  accounts  of  maturity  31 daya,  88
days,  6  months  or  one  year. Only the  interest  rate  on savings  accounts  is
being  fixed  by the  Central  Bank,  all  other  interest  rates  being
discretionary  for  the  banks. Since  it  began  to  be administered  by the
Central  Bank  in 1986,  the  savings  rate  has increased  far  more  rapidly  than
the  other  rates  (Figure  6).  From  being  the  lowest  of the  three  deposit
rates  shown  in 1984  it  has  become  the  highest. It seems  that  movements  in
this  administered  rate  have  had little  influence  on the  other  posted  rates.
To  verify  this  apparent  lack  of influence,  regression  analysis  was
performed  on the  quarterly  evolution  of interest  rates  between  1984  and
1988. The following  equation  provided  a reasonable  fit  to the  movements  in
the  Lesotho  call  deposit  rate:
dCALL 1* 3 - -2.94  +  0.503  dCALLu..  - 0.530  GAP(-l)
(5.4)  (8.8)  (5.4)
RSQ  - 0.861  SEE  - 0.597  DW  - 2.65
where  dCALL  means  the  quarterly  change  in  the  call  rate,  the  superscripts
"les"  and "rsa"  refer  to the  countries  and "GAP(-l)  is  last  quarter's
differential  between  the  rates  in  the  two  countries. (T-statistics  in
parentheses).
The  above  equation  implies  that  about  one-half  of any  change  in  the  RSA
call  rate  is transmitted  in the  same  quarter  to  the  Lesotho  call  rate.
Over  time,  the  gap  between  the  two  rates  tends  to converge  to  a steady  six17
per  cent  or so.  Inclusion  of the  Lesotho  savings  rate  in the  above
equation  did  not add  significantly  to  the  explanatory  power  of the
equation.
The  statistical  evidence  thus  suggests  that  market  forces,  in the  form  of
the  competitive  rate in  RSA,  do play  the  determining  role in  the  movements
of non-administered  deposit  interest  rates  in  Lesotho,  but  that  there
remains  a persistent  international  differential  between  the  average  levels
of these  rates.
5 Concluding  remarks
By joining  currency  unions,  some.  fifteen  African  countries  have  erjoyed  an
otherwise  hard-to-achievre  degree  of credibility  for  policies  of  monetary
stability. The  conclusion  to  be drawn  from  the  empir:ical  analysis  in  this
paper  is that  membership  of a currency  union  does  provide  considerable
discipline  in  monetary  and  price  developments.  While  the  members  of the
African  currency  unions  do not  have identical  inflation  or interest  rates,
the  evidence  discussed  above  implies  that  the  long-term  trend  of inflation
converges  to that  in the  core  country  (France  or South  Africa). Transitory
deviations  are  apparently  caused  more  by fiscal  policy  than  by monetary
deviations.  More limited  data  on interest  rates  also  suggests  convergence  of
the  movements  of  uncontrolled  interest  rates  to those  of the  core  country.
Excessive  credit  expansion,  rather  than  stimulating  the  economy,  tends  to
leak  out  into  the  balance  of payments.
The  currency  unions  have  not  been  without  their  episodes  of financial  stress.
In  particular  excessive  government  spending  in some  countries  has  resulted  in
heavy  problems  of indebtedness.  Furthermore,  wage  levels,  Trhich  have  not
been studied  in  this  paper  are  thought  by some  to  have  adjusted  less  well  to
external  pressures 27. Nevertheless,  the  evidence  provided  in  this  paper
points  to real  stabilizing  benefits  of  membership  in  a currency  union.
27 See  Levy  and  Newman  (1989)  for  a discussion  of wage  adjustment  in  Cote
d'Ivoire  based  on  micro  data. A general  discussion  of the  adjustment
problems  of the  franc  zone  is  in Devarajan  and  de Melo (1987). A companion
paper,  Honohan  (1989),  is  also  relevant  in  this  context.18
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